10-12 page research paper
Format:
Your completed paper should be TYPED and DOUBLE-SPACED;
top, bottom, left, and right margins should be one inch, and the paper
should be compiled in the following order:
- Title
Page
The title page should include the title of your paper, your
name, the number and title of the course, the name of the institution, and the
date of submission. This information is normally centered between the top and
bottom, and left and right margins. A title page is not numbered. You should
use a page break to separate the title page from the narrative of the paper.
- Page
One
Center the title of the paper, followed by your name,
just above the first line of the research paper. The first page of the paper is
not numbered but counts as page number one. You began your narrative several
spaces below the title and your name.
- The
Remaining Pages - Your
first paragraph introduces your topic. It should have a brief summary of
the topic, why the topic is important, and/or an interesting story to get
the reader’s attention. The introduction must contain your thesis
statement and brief means of how you are going to prove/support your
thesis. You may feel that your second paragraph of the paper should
be a summary of how you intend to prove the thesis so that the first
paragraph is not too long. - The
remaining pages is a logical series of paragraphs that present your
evidence to prove the thesis. They can be organized chronologically,
topically, or some other manner as long as it organized and logical in
leading the reader to the conclusion. - Completely
avoid the use of first and second person except in direct quotes and avoid
as much as possible the use of passive voice a you write your paper. - Add
footnotes/endnotes and explanatory notes as appropriate as you add new
material to your narrative. - The
last paragraph should be a summary of the paper; in many ways, a retelling
of what you wrote in the introduction. - Bibliography/Works
Cited Page
Your Bibliography/Works Cited page is the
last page of your paper. You should use a page break to separate the Works
Cited page from the narrative of the paper. The bibliography/works cited
entries should be in the formats, specified by the Turabian style manual.
General topic of the paper:
I intend to use the topic of the Munich Analogy, which US presidents and their advisors used in their decisions that led the US into growing US financial, economic, and military support of South Vietnam in the 1950s and 1960s.
Tentative title:
The Munich Analogy: Its Influence on U.S. Policy in South Vietnam during the 1950s and 1960s
Tentative thesis (what you intend to prove in the paper):
The Munich Analogy significantly influenced U.S. Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson and their advisors in shaping their decision-making processes regarding escalating financial, economic, and military support for South Vietnam in the 1950s and 1960s by fostering a belief that appeasing aggression would lead to greater global instability and threaten American interests, ultimately driving a commitment to prevent the spread of communism in Southeast Asia.
Summary of the proposed paper (250-300 words)
The Munich Analogy refers to the historical comparison made by U.S. leaders between the appeasement of Nazi Germany in the 1930s and the perceived threat of communism in the post-World War II era. This analogy became a pivotal lens through which Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson viewed their foreign policy decisions, particularly regarding Vietnam. The belief that failing to confront aggression would lead to dire consequences was rooted in a fear of broader global instability. During the 1950s, as communism began to spread in Asia, the United States sought to contain this influence, perceiving South Vietnam as a critical front in the Cold War. President Eisenhower’s administration initially laid the groundwork for American involvement, promoting financial and military aid to the South Vietnamese government. Eisenhower’s commitment was driven by the belief that a failure to support South Vietnam would mirror the errors made during the Munich Agreement, where Western powers allowed Hitler to expand unchecked. As the situation in Vietnam escalated, President Kennedy adopted the Munich Analogy to justify increased military advisors and resources. His administration feared that a collapse of South Vietnam would trigger a domino effect, leading to the fall of other Southeast Asian nations to communism. Kennedy’s policies reflected a deepening commitment to prevent what he perceived as a catastrophic failure of American resolve. Under President Johnson, the Munich Analogy continued to guide U.S. involvement. The Gulf of Tonkin incident in 1964 provided a pretext for escalated military action. Johnson and his advisors invoked the analogy to rally public and congressional support for an extensive commitment, emphasizing that a strong response was necessary to avert a repeat of historical failures.