literatures discussed in Lectures in of the module. Critically asses the theory, justification and practical use of one type of risk management solution of your choice (such as High-Reliability Theory, Enterprise Risk Management, Blame Free Cultures)

Drawing on the literatures discussed in one of more of the Lectures in Part 1 of the module I put all the literatures review down here: Additional Reading Downer J. (2007) When the Chick Hits the Fan: Representativeness and Reproducibility in Technological Tests. Social Studies of Science. 37(1):7-26. doi:10.1177/0306312706064235 Hopkins, A. 1999. The Limits of Normal Accident Theory. Safety Science. 32(1-3):93-102 Shrivastava, P. Mitroff, I. Miller, D and Migliani, A. 1988. ‘Understanding Industrial Crises’. Journal of Management Studies, 25: 4, pp. 285 ff. Toft, B. Limits to the Mathematical Modelling of Disasters in Hood, C. and Jones, D.K.C. (eds) 1996. Accident and Design: Contemporary debates in risk management. London: UCL-Press. pp.99 ff. (available online through KCL library). Minimum Reading Pidgeon, N. and O’Leary, M. 2000. Man-made disasters: why technology and organizations (sometimes) fail. Safety Science. 34(1-3):15-30 Additional Reading Bensman, J. and Gerver, I. (1963) Crime and Punishment in the Factory: The Function of Deviancy in Maintaining the Social System. American Sociological Review 28(4): 588-598 Downer, J. 2010. Anatomy of a disaster: why some accidents are unavoidable. CARR Discussion Papers, DP 61. Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, LSE Gephart, R.P., Jr., (1984), `Making Sense of Organizationally Based Environmental Disasters’, Journal of Management, Volume 10, Number 2, June, pp. 205-225. * Janis, I. 1982. Groupthink. 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Kuhn, T. 1996. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (3rd ed). Chicago, Chicago University Press Pidgeon, N. 1991. Safety Culture and Risk Management in Organizati. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology22(1):129-1422(1):129-14 Pidgeon, N. 1997. The Limits to Safety? Culture, Politics, Learning and Man–Made Disasters 5(1):1-14 Reason, J. 1991. Human Error. CUP * Reason, J. 2000. ‘Human Error: models and management’, British Medical Journal. 320:768-70 (e-resource King’s Library Richardson, W. 1993. ‘Identifying the Cultural Causes of Disasters: An analysis of the Hillsborough Football Stadium Disaster’ Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, Vol 1 (1) pp.27ff. Turner, B. 1976. The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters Administrative Science Quarterly, 21(3): 378-397 * Turner, B. and Pidgeon, N. 1997. Man-made Disasters. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann * Vaughan, D. 1996. The Challenger Launch Decision: risky technology, culture and deviance at NASA. Chicago: University of Chicago Press (available online through KCL library). Vaughan, D. 2005. Organisational rituals of trial and error. in Hutter, B. and Power, M. (eds) 2005. Organisational Encounters with Risk. Cambridge: CUP. (available online through KCL library). Weir, D. 1996. ‘Risk and Disaster’. In Hood, C. and Jones, D.K.C. (eds) 1996. Accident and Design: Contemporary debates in risk management. London: UCL-Press. pp.114 ff. (available online through KCL library). 1:Minimum Reading Perrow, C. 1984. Normal accidents: living with high-risk technologies. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Especially Ch’s.1, 2, 3 & 9 (available online through KCL library) Additional Reading Minimum Reading Roberts, K. 1990. Managing High Reliability Organizations. California Management Review. 32(4): 101-113 (available online through KCL library). Additional Reading Boin, A. and Schulman, P. 2008. Assessing NASA’s Safety Culture: The Limits and Possibilities of High-Reliability Theory. Public Administration Review. 68(6):1050-62 Helmreich, R. 18.3.2000. ‘On error management: lessons from aviation’ British Medical Journal, 320:781-785 Hopkins, A. 2007. The Problem of Defining High Reliability Organisations. Working Paper 51. National Research Centre for OHS Regulation. Australian National University. * Hood, C. and Jones, D.K.C. (eds) 1996. Accident and Design: Contemporary debates in risk management. London: UCL-Press, Chapter 3 on Liability and Blame (esp. essays by Horlick Jones and A. Neil Johnston) . (available online through KCL library). Hutter, B. 2005. ‘Ways of Seeing: understanding risk in organisational settings’ in Hutter, B. and Power, M. (eds) 2005. Organisational Encounters with Risk. Cambridge: CUP (available online through KCL library) LaPorte, T. and Consolini, P. 1991. ‘Working in Practice but Not in Theory: Theoretical Challenges of “High-Reliability Organizations’. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory. 1(1): 19-48 * Lekka, C. 2011. High reliability organisations: A review of the literature. Health and Safety Executive. Provera, B., Montefusco, A. and Canato, A. 2010. A ‘No Blame’ Approach to Organizational Learning. British Journal of Management. 21(4):1057-1074 Rijpma, J. 2002. Complexity, Tight–Coupling and Reliability: Connecting Normal Accidents Theory and High Reliability Theory. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management. 5(1):15-23 (available online through KCL library). Roberts, K. 1990. ‘Some Characteristics of One Type of High Reliability Organizations’. Organization Science. 1 (2): 160-176 (available through e-journals, KCL library) * Sagan, S. 1993. The Limits of Safety. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (available online through KCL library). Weick, K. (1987) ‘Organizational Culture as a Source of High Reliability’. California Management Review. XXIX (2): 112-127 (available online through KCL library). Weick, K., Sutcliffe, K and Obstfeld, D. 1999. ‘Organizing for High Reliability: Processes of Collective Mindfulness’ in Sutton, R. and Staw, B., Research in Organizational Behavior, Volume 21: pp. 81–123 Minimum Reading Hood,C. ‘Where Extremes Meet: “SPRAT” vs “SHARK” in Public Risk Management’ in Hood, C. and Jones, D.K.C. (eds) 1996. Accident and Design: Contemporary debates in risk management. London: UCL-Press. pp.208-227 (available online through KCL library). Additional Reading Collingridge, D. 1996. ‘Resilience, Flexibility and Diversity in Managing the Risks of Technologies’ in Hood, C. and Jones, D.K.C. (eds) 1996. Accident and Design: Contemporary debates in risk management. London: UCL-Press, pp.40-45 (available online through KCL library). * Cox, L (2008) ‘What’s Wrong with Risk Matrices?’ Risk Analysis, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2008 Glossop, M. et al (2000) Review of Hazard Identification Techniques. HSL/2005/58. HSL Hillson, D. (2006) The Risk Management Universe: A Guided Tour. London: British Standards Institute Hood, C. and Rothstein, H. (2000) ‘Business Risk Management in Government: Pitfalls and Possibilities’. In Annex 2 in Report by the Comptroller and Auditor-General: Supporting Innovation: Managing Risk in Government Departments. National Audit Office. HMSO. HC864 Session 1999-2000 Hood, C. and Rothstein, H. (2001) Risk Regulation Under Pressure: Problem solving or Blame shifting? Administration & Society 33(1):21-53 * Hood, C. 2002. ‘The risk game and the blame game’, Government and Opposition 37(1):15-37 Hood, C. 2011. The Blame Game. Princeton. Princeton University Press * Lindblom, C. 1958. The science of muddling through. Public Administration Review, 19: pp.78-88 * Pickering, A and Cowley, S (2010) ‘Risk Matrices: implied accuracy and false assumptions’, 2(1) Journal of Health & Safety Research & Practice Thompson, M. and Warburton, M. 1985. ‘Decision making under contradictory certainties: how to save the Himalayas when you can’t find out what’s wrong with them’ Journal of Applied Systems Analysis. Vol.12. Ward, S (2003) Approaches to Integrated Risk Management: A Multi-dimensional Framework. Risk Management: An International Journal 5 (4) 7-23 Wildavsky, A. (1988) Searching for Safety. Ch.4 ‘Anticipation vs Resilience’. New Brunswick: Transaction Books. Minimum Reading Meyer, J and Rowan, B (1977) ‘Institutionalized organizations:formal structure as myth and ceremony’. American Journal of Sociology 83/2: 340–363. Clarke, L (2001) Mission Improbable: Using Fantasy Documents to Tame Disaster. The University of Chicago Press. Ch’s 1 and 6 Huber, M. and Rothstein, H. (2013) ‘The Risk Organisation: Or how organisations reconcile themselves to failure’. Journal of Risk Research, 16 (6): 651-675 Additional Reading Arena, M., M. Arnaboldi, and G. Azzone. 2010. The organizational dynamics of enterprise risk management. Accounting, Organization and Society 35, no. 2010: 659–75. Clarke, L. (1990) Oil-Spill Fantasies. The Atlantic Monthly. November 1990:65-77 Clarke, L. and Perrow, C. 1996. ‘Prosaic organisational Failure’ American Behavioural Scientist, 39 (8), pp.1040-56 Clarke, L. (2004) ‘What’s the Plan?’ Harvard Business Review. June 2004 DiMaggio, P. and Powell, W. (1983) ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields’ American Sociological Review 48(2):147-60 Feldman, M. and March, J. 1981. ‘Information in Organisations as Signal and Symbol’. Administrative Science Quarterly, 26 (2) 171-186 Financial Reporting Council (FRC) (2014) Guidance on Risk Management, Internal Control and Related Financial and Business Reporting, London: FRC. Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) (1999) Internal Control: Guidance for directors on the combined code, London: The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. (2005 revisions here) * Power, M. (1997) The Audit Society, Oxford University Press: Oxford. Power, M. 2004. The Risk Management of Everything: Rethinking the Politics of Uncertainty. DEMOS: London Power, M. (2005) ‘Organizational Responses to Risk: The rise of the chief risk officer’ in Hutter, B. and Power, M Eds (2005) Organizational Encounters with Risk. Cambridge: CUP (available online through KCL library) * Power, M. (2007) Organised Uncertainty. Oxford: OUP (available online through KCL library). Power, M. 2009. The risk management of nothing. Accounting, Organizations and Society 34 (6- 7): 849–855.